Tuesday, 27 June 2017

29 TO 35 FT. REVISITED.

Mr. A. Hoehling remarked in his book (Lost at Sea - referred to in previous posts) that when loaded Waratah 'drew between 29 and 35 ft.' which ensured stability, even in adverse conditions. 

The Inquiry quoted that Waratah had a maximum draft of 30 ft. 4 1/2 inches (30.375 ft.). 35 ft. is 4.6 ft. over her limit! Waratah's depth of hull was in the region of 39 ft. which would have left about 4 ft. freeboard! I am inclined to accept the data listed in the Inquiry report stating Waratah departed Durban 26 July with 28 ft. 3 in. forward and 29 ft. 5 in. aft, rather than 35 ft..  But having said this it is interesting, coming from an experienced maritime historian with appropriate timeline knowledge of steamers, that Mr. Hoehling would make such a claim, reinforcing my own beliefs (covered many times in this blog) that Waratah was too heavy / functionally overloaded and needed to be such in order to offset her potential top heaviness. 

Circa 1909, the sand bar at the mouth of Port Natal, Durban, was about 32 ft., so therefore Waratah could not have had a draught beyond 31 ft. when she left Durban for the last time. But can we be absolutely sure that she had a draught in the region of 29 ft.? I noticed, with great interest, a comment made on another blog that Waratah did not have a plimsoll line marked midships. This is extraordinary considering that the law by 1909 was quite clear on the matter: all British and foreign-going vessels had to display the plimsoll line as per the vessel's registration and classification. Such an omission should have been raised at the Inquiry. Why would Waratah not have had such a crucial indicator? 

In order to stabilise Waratah her dead weight and draught had to exceed the average draught for a steamer of her size - I have quoted a figure of 27 ft. in previous posts referring to Waratah's equivalently-sized sister ship Geelong and many other equivalently-sized steamers. But given the fact that there was no plimsoll line, can we even assume that the average figure of 29 ft. was accurate? Could she not have been in excess of 30 ft. (but less than 32 ft.)? Is there any evidence to support or disprove that Waratah took a knock clearing the sand bar at the mouth of Port Natal, and that this did not contribute to the disastrous sequence of events that were to play out along the Wild Coast?? After all when Titanic struck the iceberg, most on the upper decks were not even aware of the destructive incident.

Having said all of this my firm belief is that the expert testimony given by the officials at Port Natal was accurate and Waratah's overall draught was in the region of 29 ft., matching the figure at Port Adelaide, which as such, was still 2 ft. deeper than it should have been for her size.



CASE OF THE IONIC.

Unique ID:19562
Description:BOT Wreck Report for 'Ionic', 1909
Creator:Board of Trade
Date:1908
Copyright:Out of copyright
Partner:SCC Libraries
Partner ID:Unknown
Transcription
(No. 7273.)

"IONIC."

The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894.

IN the matter of a Formal Investigation held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, on the 1st and 8th days of June, 1909, before ARTHUR HILL HUTTON, Esquire, assisted by Commander WARREN F. CABORNE, C.B., R.N.R., and Captain J. H. WALKER, into the circumstances attending the loss of the British sailing ship "IONIC," of London, which left London on the 29th December, 1908, for East Cowes, was in company with the barge "GLENDEVON," off Beachy Head, on the 10th January last, and since that time has not been heard of.

Report of Court.

The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds for the reason stated in the Annex hereto, that the British sailing ship "Ionic" was probably run down and sunk by another vessel, presumably by the German Hamburg-America Line steamship "Bethania," off or in the neighbourhood of Beachy Head, about 9.40 p.m. on the 10th day of January, 1909, her master and crew being drowned.

Dated this 8th day of June, 1909.

ARTHUR HUTTON,

Judge.

We concur in the above Report.

 
W. F. CABORNE,

J. H. WALKER, 


Assessors. 

 

Annex to the Report.

This Inquiry was held at the Caxton Hall, Caxton Street, Westminster, on the 1st and 8th days of June, 1909.

Mr. Archibald Read, barrister-at-law, conducted the proceedings on behalf of the Solicitor to the Board of Trade (Mr. R. Ellis Cunliffe). Mr. C. Walton, barrister-at-law, appeared for the underwriters, and Mr. Alfred T. Bucknill, barrister-at-law, for the owners of the cargo. Mr. Richard Cox, the owner of the vessel, appeared in person, and was not professionally represented.

The "Ionic," Official Number 98961, was a British sailing vessel, built of wood, at Limehouse, in 1891, by Mr. Horace Shrubsall, and was registered at the Port of London. She had two masts, was spritsail rigged, and was of the following dimensions: Length 82 feet, main breadth to outside of plank 20 feet, and depth in hold from tonnage deck to ceiling at midships 7 feet. Her gross tonnage was 85.53 tons, and her registered tonnage 66.37 tons. 




She carried one boat of the description usual in this class of vessel (a seagoing sailing barge) and provided with the necessary equipment: three life buoys and three life belts; and was owned by Mr. Richard Cox, of Castle-town, Portland, in the County of Dorset, ship broker, who also acted as her manager, under advice received on the 7th of May, 1894. It should be mentioned that the vessel was acquired by Mr. Cox from Mr. Shrubsall, her builder, in 1894; the latter having himself employed her from the time she was built.

The "Ionic" loaded, in London, a cargo, consisting of 85 tons of pig lead and 44 tons weight of teak timber, making a total of 129 tons; her dead weight capacity being about 160 tons. There is no evidence as to her draught on this occasion. Fully laden, she would draw about 6 feet 6 inches, or 6 feet 7 inches, and her freeboard would be about 14 inches.

At 6.45 a.m. of the 29th December, 1908, she left the South West India Dock, bound for Cowes and Exeter, apparently in a seaworthy condition, under the command of Mr. Henry F. Phillips, who held no certificate of competency, manned by a crew of three hands, all told. Thence she proceeded to Gravesend, which she left on the 2nd of January, 1909, in company with the sailing barge "Glendevon," putting into Margate on the 5th of January, and into Dover on the 8th January.

The "Ionic" and the "Glendevon" appear to have kept together after their departure from Gravesend, and both vessels left Dover on the 9th of January, the "Ionic" preceding the "Glendevon" by about an hour.

At 5.45 p.m. of the 10th of January the "Ionic" and the "Glendevon" were off Eastbourne, the latter being abreast of, and about two miles distant from, the pier, with the former a mile astern of her. There was then a moderate breeze from the west, the weather was clear, the sea was smooth, and both vessels were on the starboard tack, carrying all sails; jib, foresail, mainsail, and mizen and were making from four to five knots through the water. Under these circumstances, and about this time, the master of the "Glendevon" (Mr. Charles Moore) lost sight of the lights of the "Ionic," which were then burning brightly; and of the subsequent movements of the latter vessel there is no direct evidence. 

Between 10 and 11 o'clock of the same evening, the "Glendevon" found it necessary to shorten sail on account of an increase in the wind; but there was nothing in the character of the weather calculated to cause disaster to the "Ionic," which was in good trim.

On the 18th of February, 1909, Monsieur Jules Popelier, master of the Belgian fishing smack B 46, "Marie Antoinette," of Blankenberghe, when a short distance to the south-eastward of the "North Hinder" light vessel, picked up a boat, many planks of which were broken about the centre and after end, with the name "Ionic, London," painted on its stern.

There, under ordinary circumstances, all knowledge as to the fate of the vessel might have terminated. But on the 9th of March, 1909, the Marine Court at Hamburg sat to investigate a casualty which had occurred to the German Hamburg-America Line steamship "Bethania," 4,848 tons register, commanded by Captain Meyerdierck. From a translation of the proceedings of that Court, put in by consent of the respective parties, it appears that about 9.40 p.m. of the 10th of January, 1909, the "Bethania," which was on a voyage from Hamburg to New York, and was then in the neighbourhood of Beachy Head, came into collision with an unknown vessel, apparently rigged like a fishing boat, and standing towards the English coast, which vessel was supposed to have sunk with her crew, though every effort was made by the German steamer to find her, with a view to saving life. In that report the weather at the time of the collision is variously described. In one place it is said that it was foggy; the chief officer, who was in charge of the deck of the "Bethania," stated that it was very dark and rainy, but that lights were visible; while Captain Meyerdierck described the night as very dark, and the wind W.S.W. Only one witness, the third officer, appeared to have seen anyone on the deck of the unknown vessel, and he thought that he saw a man fall overboard at the time of the collision. The catastrophe was, by the witnesses before the Hamburg Court, ascribed to the fact that the "feeble" green light of the unknown craft was not seen until too late to avoid collision, and that no stern light was visible to those on board the "Bethania"; but these are matters upon which this Court can express no opinion, there being no evidence before it bearing upon them.

The Marine Court of Hamburg, having considered the disappearance of the "Ionic," which had been officially posted at Lloyds' as a total loss, the finding of her boat and other wreckage, the position in which the collision occurred, and that in which the "Ionic" might have been at the time, arrived at the following decision:

"On the evening of 10th January, 1909, off Beachy Head, a collision took place between the steamship 'Bethania' and an unknown sailing vessel, presumably the spritsail barque" (? barge) "'Ionic,' of London, whereby the latter vessel was sunk and her crew drowned. The casualty is due to the green light of the sailing vessel only having been sighted on board the 'Bethania,' in spite of due precaution, immediately before the collision. Whether this green light was burning badly, or was obscured, could not be ascertained with certainty. No fault is to be found with the navigation of the 'Bethania,' nor with the attempts at rescue, made after the occurrence."

This Court, in view of the evidence before it, is of the same opinion as the Marine Court of Hamburg as to the probability of the vessel with which the "Bethania" collided having been the "Ionic"; but in the absence of evidence has no cognizance of the other matters dealt with in the judgment of that tribunal.

At the conclusion of the evidence, Mr. Read, on behalf of the Board of Trade, submitted the following questions for the opinion of the Court:

(1) What was the cost of the vessel to her owner? What insurances were effected upon and in connection with her?

(2) When the vessel left London on or about the 29th of December last.

(a) Was she in good and seaworthy condition as regards hull and equipments?

(b) Was her cargo properly stowed and secured from shifting?

(c) Had she the required freeboard, and was she in good trim for a voyage to Cowes and Exeter?

(3) What is the cause of the vessel not having been heard of since she was lost sight of by the master of the barge "Glendevon," at or about 5.45 p.m. on the 10th of January last?

Mr. Bucknill and Mr. Read then addressed the Court, and the Court gave judgment as above, and returned the following answers to the questions of the Board of Trade:

(1) The cost of the vessel to her owner, in 1894, was £941 17s. 4d., and she was completely overhauled, in 1908, at a charge of £247 15s. 2d. Only one insurance, amounting to £500, was effected upon and in connection with her.

(2) When the vessel left London on or about the 29th of December last.

(a) She was in good and seaworthy condition as regards hull and equipments;

(b) Her cargo was properly stowed and secured from shifting;

(c) She had the required freeboard, and was in good trim for a voyage to Cowes and Exeter.

(3) There is no direct evidence as to the actual cause of the vessel not having been heard of since she was lost sight of by the master of the barge "Glendevon," at or about 5.45 p.m. of the 10th of January last. But, according to the decision of the Marine Court of Hamburg, under date of the 9th of March, 1909, a collision took place about 9.40 p.m. of the 10th of January last, off Beachy Head, between the German Hamburg-America Line steamship "Bethania" and an unkown sailing vessel, presumed by that Court to be the spritsail barge "Ionic," of London, whereby the latter vessel was sunk, and her crew drowned; and that decision being consistent with the facts now proved, this Court is of opinion that the "Ionic" was run down and sunk by another vessel, presumably the "Bethania," somewhere off Beachy Head, about the time above mentioned, her master and crew being drowned.

ARTHUR HUTTON,

Judge.

We concur.

W. F. CABORNE

Assessors.

J. H. WALKER  

LIST OF THOSE LOST IN THE "IONIC."

Name.

Rating.

Nationality.

Henry F. Phillips

Master

British.

William Alexander

Mate

British.

William Ernest Usher

Boy

British.

(Issued in London by the Board of Trade on the 29th day of June, 1909.) 


This is a fascinating case study. One could easily come to the conclusion that the Inquiry was a whitewash, resembling the white cliffs of Dover, Beachy Head. Bizarre that the crew of the Bethania claimed that the weather was not clear (foggy; rainy; dark), sharply contrasting with the crew of the Glendevon stating that weather was fine. Furthermore, the crew of the latter stated that the lights of the Ionic were burning brightly - subsequently disappearing, roughly one mile astern shortly before 6 pm. The crew of the Bethania, on the other hand, claimed that the green light of the 'Ionic' was faint, a 'substantial' reason for running into and destroying the vessel at about 9.40 pm that night.

As if to make matters worse, neither the crew of the Bethania (despite claims to the contrary) nor the crew of the Glendevon did very much to investigate or attempt rescue of life. It certainly does not say much for the inquiring mind of the Board of Trade Inquiry. Now if there had been 1500 lost, as in the case of the high profile Titanic, would this have been allowed / tolerated? The Ionic was reported to be perfectly seaworthy and yet the Inquiry did not have the draught measurements before her final departure from port, assuming that almost fully loaded, she was within maximum draught limitations. 

Ridiculous!!

Once the bright lights of both Ionic and Waratah had disappeared, these observable facts coincided with both vessels vanishing without a trace.

There is a gap in time frame between 5.45 pm and 9.40 pm which did not seem to bother the Court much as did the loss of life. 

This case does not say much for the credibility of the Board of Trade, circa 1909!!



Beachy Head

Monday, 26 June 2017

EXPLOSIONS NOT HEARD.

'as the report of the rockets was not heard by everyone in the lifeboats, which were obviously closer to the source of detonation.'

Lee, Paul. The Titanic and the Indifferent Stranger (Kindle Locations 3328-3329). Unknown. Kindle Edition.

Returning again to the two mysterious flashes of light seen from the Harlow by more than one witness, I have repeatedly asserted that they could have been red socket signals, WITHOUT detonators. However, this extract illustrates that passengers in lifeboats well within a 4 mile radius of the sinking Titanic DID NOT necessarily hear the detonations of multiple distress rockets. It therefore does not necessarily follow that Captain Bruce and his officers SHOULD HAVE heard explosions from socket distress signals.



COALING.

The Sydney Morning Herald, Monday 13 November, 1882.

SINKING
OF THE
S.S. AUSTRAL.
LOSS OF FIVE LIVES.

.......which befel the magnificent Orient
liner Austral, at 4 o'clock on Saturday morning.
Whilst lying snugly at anchor in Neutral Bay, 
receiving coal from a tender alongside, she suddenly  
listed over, and her ports being open, the water
poured in so rapidly that she foundered in a few
minutes. There were on board at the time the officers
and crew, numbering between 70 and 80 men, and of
these five are known to have perished.

Austral, which met with an accident to her machinery
on her last voyage from England, sank this morning,
about 4 o'clock in Neutral Bay, just off Kirribilli
Point, whither she had been removed a day or two ago.

The Austral had been busily coaling for some
time from lighters moored alongside of her. The
coal, however, had been placed on the bunkers
on the starboard side which gave the vessel
a list and as the weight gradually increased, the water
rose nearer to her lower portholes. These were, 
unfortunatelv left open; and immediately they reached the
level of the water a torrent poured into her which no
human skill could counteract. The vessel gradually
filled and settled down into between 40 and 50 feet of
water her decks being covered by probably two feet,
and her masts being, of course, almost entirely above
water.

Injudicious loading of coal could and did have disastrous consequences, whether the steamers involved were top heavy or not. Massive inundation of water could cause steamers to founder within minutes.

There had been similar problems loading and coaling Waratah at Sydney during her maiden voyage. However, by the time Waratah was due to depart Durban (for the last time) coaling took place on the boat deck, via a coal chute forward of the funnel. Although a difficult process (coaling manager was loud in his complaints) and dirty for those on the upper decks, it does appear to be a more sensible approach, obviating significant weight on the side of the steamer adjacent to the wharf. Over the course of two voyages lessons were learned and adjustments made.

108 years ago Waratah departed Sydney's Central Wharf, Miller's Point, at noon (ref. S Leff-Patterson). The die was cast and fate in all its cruelty to be played out by 27 July, 1909.

Austral

Saturday, 24 June 2017

9000 TONS DEAD WEIGHT CARGO.

The Advertiser (Adelaide) Wednesday 18 May, 1910

Mr. J. C. Neill, Port Adelaide manager
for Messrs. George Wills & Co. (agents for
the steamer), stated that while the Waratah 
was at Port Adelaide on her inward
passage in June she loaded 1,000 tons of
lead concentrates, which were put amid-
ships in No. 3 hold. It was not unusual
to take in dead weight at Port Adelaide.
When she returned from the eastern States
she loaded cargo at Ocean Steamers' wharf
and at the Outer Harbor, and in addition
took in 180 tons of bunker coal, which was
placed in the bunkers. She had no coal
on deck when she left the Outer Harbor.
He estimated the total dead weight of
cargo on board at 9,000 tons, and that her
draft was 28 ft. 3 in. forward and 29 ft.
5 in. aft. 

Why would Mr. Neill, a respected manager, exaggerate a dead weight of 9000 tons cargo on board Waratah, if it were not the case? Furthermore, her draught for 9000 tons was exactly the same when Waratah departed Durban for the last time. It is suggested that a further 300 - 500 tons of lead concentrates were added to hold 3, before departing for Durban. This was a very heavy, GM stable steamer setting out into the vast Indian Ocean.

Captain Ilbery always spoke
most highly and proudly of the Waratah,
and never suggested any defect or any-
thing remarkable about her behaviour at
sea. All the principal officers on
the last voyage were on the ship
on her maiden voyage, and Mr. Neill never
heard any statement or hint as to any defects. 
The cargo shipped for Durban consisted of 
89 tons of flour and dried fruits,
and for Cape Town 318 tons of wheat and
flour.

One has to take into consideration the human condition. Captain Ilbery and his officers were proud men, unlikely to share misgivings with all and sundry. They represented the Blue Anchor Line and their very jobs depended on the economic viability of the Lund enterprise. If they were to have verbalised reservations about the Waratah at every port, it would no doubt have adversely affected their careers. Even though Captain Ilbery was due to retire he was undoubtedly proud and loyal to his employers. Furthermore, by the last voyage, Captain Ilbery and his officers could not have had reservations about GM stability, but might well have had concerns about reduced freeboard (buoyancy) and the under-powered quadruple expansion engines - hoping for a voyage without a storm of 'exceptional violence'.

Mr. W. Fisher (manager of the South
Australian Stevedoring Company) stated
that the usual course was followed in regard 
to the supply of the loading plant by the agents 
of the Waratah. The Adelaide cargo of the steamer 
was thoroughly well and judiciously stowed.

He would say that, wouldn't he and a stiff, upright steamer departing the port was confirmation in itself.

The Waratah took the ground alongside the wharf at
Port Adelaide at low water, but as the
bottom was mud no harm resulted. When
the loading was completed the ship
was perfectly upright, and, as far
as he knew, in a thoroughly seaworthy 
condition. 

With 9000 tons of dead weight cargo, the Waratah had to be stiff. Taking the ground, in my opinion, was a very serious matter. What hull plate damage sustained, we shall never know...

Captain J. G. Gibbon (surveyor to the
Underwriters' Association) said he had no
occasion to take exception to anything 
connected with the loading of the Waratah.

Well that confirms that.

Pilot Girling said that when piloting the
Waratah outwards to Melbourne in December, 
1908, with a draft of 26 ft. and 21 ft.
6 in. forward, she was "very tender, in-
deed," when rounding Schnapper Point.
There was a strong south-west wind at the
time.

This paragraph sums up the Waratah dilemma - note that it was December 1908, not June / July, 1909. Waratah should have had a draught of 26.9 ft., similar to that of the Geelong but because of the additional deck was 'very tender' at this draught. It is completely logical that adjustments made to counteract tenderness involved functional overloading which increased the draught to beyond 28 ft. which created its own (much-repeated) problems.

.....Sometimes when going head to wind in
quite ordinary weather she would take
more water over her than one would expect 
in the circumstances. 

Not surprising when one considers excessive draught and limited freeboard (+ reduced sheer).

At Cape Town, when going alongside the 
wharf a boat on the port side was taken 
inboard, and it took 14 men to do it, 
because the davits were so stiff. 
The same thing occurred
when taking a starboard boat inboard
alongside the wharf at Port Adelaide.
These were the only two boats moved
while he was on board.

Even if there had been a remote chance of launching lifeboats in the final moments, this factor would have presented a significant obstacle to the operation.

Charles Augustus Johnson (wharf man-
ager at the Outer Harbor) said he knew
Captain Ilbery had a strong objection to his
ship touching the bottom alongside the
wharf at Port Adelaide, for he heard him
say to the agent just before sailing that he
did not think it right or fair for a vessel
of her size and weight to be on the bottom, 
as she was in Port Adelaide. 

This confirms my opinion about the weight of the Waratah. Captain Ilbery knew the implications of keel forces such as this and had good reason to be concerned. We shall never know if or the extent of hull plate and rivet damage when Waratah made her way down the Wild Coast, but my suspicions, remembering the case of the Koombana, are firmly in the camp of damaged plates, placed under further considerable strain.

Koombana, Broome, 1911 - one shudders to think of the huge, heavy Waratah doing the same.

WHO CAN ARGUE AGAINST CAPTAIN TICKELL?

The Mercury, Tuesday 19 April, 1910
Captain Frederick Tickell, whose sonwas a passenger on the Waratah on herlast voyage, states that he saw the vessel leave Port Melbourne on July 1, 1909.She was perfectly upright, and had nosign of a list. He saw the Waratah proceeding astern of the Pilbarra, on whichhe was a passenger from Port Adelaide,down river to Largs Bay on July 6. Hewatched her with a professional eye, andat no time did she give him the impression of a tender ship. She remained perfectly upright oven when going roundthe bends, and at a time when the rudderwas over, and the tug which was assistingher was broad on the bow.
Captain Tickell's account remains one of the most important eye witness testimonies from the time. This was a man who had lost his only son with the Waratah. If there was going to be a witness, experienced seaman, with a grudge against the flagship, surely it should have been he? 
Captain Tickell commented on a vessel, ready for sea, which was completely stable from a metacentric height point of view. If Captain Tickell resented the loss of his son on a ship which had acquired a reputation of top heaviness, he did not allow this to cloud his judgment and account.
Of all the myriad accounts, this one probably gives the clearest and most accurate account of the Waratah, which did not go to sea top heavy and 'light' during her final voyage.



Thursday, 22 June 2017

£6,000,000

SHIPPING DISASTERS IN 1910.
LLOYD'S LOSSES OVER £6,000,000.
PERICLES AND WARATAH.
LONDON.
Lloyd's losses in 1910 were very heavy,
totalling no less than .£6,000,000. Chief
among the disasters were the foundering of
the Australian liners Pericles and Waratah.
The sinking of the former represented a
loss of £750,000, while the disappearance of
the Lund liner in 1909 meant a loss of
£300,000.

One has an impression that the loss of the Waratah was unique and the shortcomings of the steamer unacceptable by the standards of the time. This article casts a more realistic light on the subject, with Lloyd's losses amounting to a gargantuan 6 million pounds in 1910. Reaching one's destination was by no means guaranteed. It is interesting to note that the Pericles, similar size, was insured for far more - even taking into consideration her vast cargo of valuable butter. Does make one wonder....

STRUCK A ROCK?

Lyons, a steward, said:-"I heard theboatswain say, 'I would not like tobe on this ship in a storm. She wouldgo to the bottom.' I heard the sailorssay they had to fill tanks to get herstraight, as she rolled too much. On thesecond voyage I believe the ship struck asubmerged rock after leaving Adelaide and loosened the plates underneath.
This is a fascinating piece of 'rumour' or fact? It seems strange that this would be the only account of Waratah striking some object after departing Adelaide on her final voyage. Rather than a rock, if this be true, it would more likely to have been submerged wreckage. If Mr. Lyons only got half the story right, there might be another explanation for 'loosened the plates underneath'. We know that Waratah took the ground at the wharf, Adelaide, prior to departure, and that Captain Ilbery was extremely upset about the incident, claiming that Waratah was too large and heavy to be subjected to such forces on her hull. Although most steamers appeared to have coped with this phenomenon, Waratah was unique in respect of size and heavy loading / ballast. Captain Ilbery stated on arrival at Durban that Waratah had sustained NO damage since departing Adelaide, but the wording did NOT include, damage sustained AT Adelaide! In the case of the Koombana which ran aground Shark Bay, Western Australia, significant hull plate damage was sustained but not detected until much later when Koombana was put into dry dock, Sydney. Damage to Waratah's hull might, in the same fashion, have been drastically under-estimated. If the Harlow account be true, loosened plates, fire heat damage, hull stress due to heavy load and ballast, might have created the scenario for the steamer disappearing within minutes after striking the St John reef, Bluff Point. Watertight compartments were intended to keep the steamer afloat if one or perhaps two compartments were punctured. Waratah might very well have sustained a series of glancing blows much like the RMS Titanic rendering her doomed. There is another possibility that due to heavy loading, water tight doors were not able to be adequately closed in an emergency. Speculation runs rife :)


Tuesday, 20 June 2017

DRAUGHT AND POWER COMPARISONS.

The following comparative steamers all had significant top hampers, but crucially, significantly lower maximum draughts compared with Waratah. Waratah should in reality have had a draught in the region of 27 ft.. But due to inherent top heaviness, this was not possible, resulting in functional overloading (including ballast). Furthermore Waratah was significantly under powered which, taking into consideration her functional overloading and reduced freeboard, was never going to be a recipe for a successful steamer:

SS Otranto:

Type:Passenger liner 
Tonnage:
Length:535 ft 4 in (163.2 m)
Beam:64 ft (19.5 m)
Depth:38 ft 8 in (11.8 m)
Installed power:14,000 ihp (10,000 kW)
Propulsion:
Speed:18 knots (33 km/h; 21 mph)
Capacity:
  • Passengers:
  • 235 1st class
  • 186 2nd class
  • 696 3rd class

mean draught 25.75 ft. 

Note that although Otranto had a similar depth to Waratah (38 ft. 8 in. vs 38 ft. 6 in), she was registered for a max mean draught of 25.75 ft., not 30.375 ft.



SS Otranto



SS Falaba

details
tonnage4806  grt
dimensions116 x 14.45 x 7 m
materialsteel
engine1 x 3 cyl. triple expansion engine, single shaft, 1 screw, 4 boilers
power424  n.h.p.
speed14  knots
yard no.414
IMO/Off. no.124000

mean draught 22.9 ft.




SS Falaba



SS Dongala

SS DONGALA                                      SS WARATAH

Built:           1905                                                    1908
Builders:      Barclay, Curle, & Co                          same
Gross tons:   8038                                                   9339.07
Net tons:       4723                                                  6003.96
Length:         470 ft.                                                465 ft.
Beam:           56.25 ft.                                             59.45 ft.
Draught:       27.75 ft.                                             30.375 ft.
Engines:       twin quadruple                                   same
Power:          8000 ihp                                             5400 ihp

mean draught 27.75 ft.

Note 8000 ihp vs 5400 ihp.



SS Dongala



RMS Morea

  • Gross tonnage: 10,890 grt                                                   9339.07 grt   
  • Net tonnage: 5,960 nrt                                                        6003.96 nrt   
  • Deadweight: N/K
  • Length: 164.53m (540.0ft)                                                   465 ft.     
  • Breadth: 18.65m (61.2ft)                                                     59.45 ft.   
  • Depth: N/K
  • Draught:  7.53m (24.7ft) - corrected.                                  30.375 ft.  
  • Engines: Quadruple-expansion steam engines                     similar 
  • Engine builders: Barclay, Curle & Co Ltd                             same
  • Works: Glasgow
  • Country: UK
  • Power: 13,000 ihp                                                                 5400 ihp 

mean draught 24.7 ft.

Note 13 000 ihp vs 5400 ihp.


RMS Morea



SS Anchises

SS Anchises:                                                      SS Waratah:

10046 gross tons                                           9339.07 gross tons
6380 net tons                                                 6003.96 net tons
493 ft. length                                                  465 ft. length
60 ft. beam                                                     59.45 ft. beam
37 ft. depth                                                     38.5 ft. depth
29 ft. draught                                                  30.375 ft.
2 x triple expansion engines, twin screw      2 x quadruple expansion, twin screw
14 knots                                                          13.5 knots

mean draught 29 ft. 

This is the only comparative steamer with a draught approaching that of Waratah's, without reported problems.


SS Anchises



SS Assaye, built 1899, 7396 gross tons, 4484 net tons, length 450 ft. beam 54.25 ft., draught 26 ft. 2 in.

mean draught 26 ft. 2 in.


SS Assaye


SS Erinpura, 5128 gross tons, length 411 ft., beam 52.5 ft., draught 23 ft. 5 in

mean draught 23 ft. 5 in.


SS Erinpura




SS Devanha, built 1905, gross tons 8092, length 470 ft., beam 56 ft. 3 in., draught 27 ft. 8 in.

mean draught 27 ft. 8 in.





SS Sicilia, Barclay Curle & Co, built 1901, gross tonnage 6696, net tonnage 4174, length 450 ft., beam 52 ft. 4 in., draught 26 ft. 8 in.

mean draught 26 ft. 8 in.


SS Sicilia



HMHS Varela, gross tonnage 4645, net tonnage 1932, dead weight 5160 tons, length 390 ft., beam 53.3 ft., draught 22.9 ft.

mean draught 22.9 ft.




Let's revisit SS Indarra, a steamer which suffered similar problems to Waratah and had to be materially altered to reduce draught.

           SS INDARRA                                           SS WARATAH:

Engines:     twin quadruple                                     same

Launched:  1912                                                     1908

Gross tons: 9735                                                     9339.07

Length:       450 ft.                                                  465 ft.

Beam:         60 ft.                                                    59.45 ft.

Draught:      32 ft.                                                   30.375 ft.


mean draught 32 ft. takes the cake and prize. Her upper deck was removed during a major refit.


Waratah's twin quadruple expansion engines were under powered for her size. I have put together a few examples (from many) of twin engine (screw) steamers of the era:

SS Waratah, built 1908

gross tonnage      9339
length                  465 ft.
beam                   59.45 ft.
power                  5 400 ihp
speed                   13 to 13.5 knots


SS Omrah, built 1899

gross tonnage     8130 
length                 490.5 ft. 
beam                   57 ft.
power                  9 000 ihp
speed                   17 knots


SS Wiltshire, built 1912 

gross tonnage      10 390
length                   526.5 ft.
beam                    61.4 ft.
power                   13 000 ihp
speed                    14 knots


SS Hororata, built 1914

gross tonnage       9461
length                   511 ft.
beam                    64.3 ft.
power                   8 493 ihp
speed                    14 knots


RMS Morea, built 1908

gross tonnage       10890
length                    540 ft.
beam                     61.2 ft.
power                    13 000 ihp
speed                     16 knots


SS Indarra, built 1912

gross tonnage        9735
length                    450 ft.
beam                     60 ft.
power                    8 132 ihp
speed                     16 knots


SS Assaye, built 1899

gross tonnage        7396
length                    450 ft.
beam                     54.25 ft.
power                    6 500 ihp
speed                     16 knots


SS Devanha, built 1905

gross tonnage         8092
length                     470 ft.
beam                       56 ft.
power                     8 000 ihp
speed                      15.5 knots


To put this important issue into perspective, let's take a closer look at the famous RMS Baltic:


Tonnage:23,876 GT
Length:729 ft (222.7 m)
Beam:75.6 ft (23.1 m)
Propulsion:Two four-cylinder quadruple expansion engines powering two propellers.
Speed:16 knots (30 km/h; 18 mph)
Capacity:2,875 people

At the time of launch Baltic was the largest steamer afloat (until 1905). On her maiden voyage, she completed the distance between Liverpool and New York (2871 n miles) in 7 days and 13 hours, which matched her registered speed of 16 knots. Despite the excellent crossing time, Baltic was proven to be under powered, her twin quadruple expansion engines being the same capacity as her smaller siblings, Celtic, Cedric and Adriatic. Power output was 14 000 ihp, but for her size, should have been 16 000 ihp. Modifications were made at a later stage to improve the output. It is important to note that being under powered did not affect speed under normal conditions. However, in heavy seas, an under powered steamer would have had difficulty maintaining speed / heading = unsafe. Manoeuvrability would also have been compromised, catastrophic if the vessel was caught broad side in a fierce gale. 

If one uses the Baltic as a frame of reference the Waratah should at the very least have had a power output of 6 226 ihp, not 5 400 ihp.

This casts an intriguing light on circumstances off the Wild Coast, 27 July. The falling barometer and physical signs presaging the approach of a cold front storm of 'exceptional violence' would have alerted Captain Ilbery to potential problems. Waratah was heavily laden and under powered. A decision might have been taken to come about irrespective of whether there was a fire on board or not. Captain Bruce remarked that Waratah was smoking fiercely, which might very well have been due to a fire, but also a sign (excessive, dark smoke from funnel) that the engines of the Waratah were being 'pressed' to outrun the approaching storm. It was mentioned at the Inquiry that 15 additional tons of coal were consumed daily on the final voyage, partly due to 'pressing' under powered engines. 

There might not have been a fire at all !

Mr Grigg summed up Waratah's limitations to perfection:

The Waratah, he said; lurched very badly, 
and in an unusual way, and would breast 
the waves in a wriggling, zigzag manner, 
giving the passengers some misgivings
concerning her.




SS Indarra